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ABSTRACT

Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) are a major cause of morbidity and
mortality and a public health priority. However, standard procedures and comprehensive
guidelines for HAI outbreak detection and response are still needed. This hybrid thesis
describes what is known about HAI outbreaks in the introduction, reviews the HAI
outbreaks reported to New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH), in the first paper,
and then in the second paper examines how established methods for detecting infectious
disease outbreaks perform in identifying Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) outbreaks
in long-term care facilities (LTCF) in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, and finally, it
closes with our overall conclusions at this time from this work. Our main findings are that
gastrointestinal illness, most commonly norovirus, in LTCFs is most likely to be reported
and that in LTCFs the least complex threshold method performs with the highest
sensitivity and specificity in detecting possible CDI outbreaks.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Every day, one in 25 patients in acute care health facilities have a healthcareassociated infection (HAI) (1). A variety of pathogens ranging from very common
norovirus to rare, but increasing carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae cause HAIs.
Additionally, HAIs also put healthcare personnel at risk. A particularly important
problem is when HAIs cause an outbreak. In an outbreak HAIs can spread rapidly, cause
health facilities to close, and be a sign of infection-control issues. Investigating HAI
outbreaks can uncover underlying systemic problems and guide interventions that may
globally improve infection control processes. Response to a particular outbreak has the
potential to reduce outbreaks of other HAIs through improvement in infection control
practices. For example, recommendations for improved respiratory protection during
intubation procedures, raised in an investigation of an influenza outbreak, would likely
protect healthcare personnel from other pathogens that are transmitted by droplets.
In the U.S., there are well-established surveillance systems, such as the National
Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), for tracking the incidence of particular pathogens,
such as Clostridium difficile, and particular sites of infections such as central lineassociated blood stream infections (CLABSI). Surveillance systems can assist in the
detection of outbreaks. However, without standard definitions and response practices,
HAI outbreaks cannot be compared or evaluated and may go undetected. For some
infections, thresholds for investigation have been developed and implemented as general
infection control guidance (e.g. ≥2 cases of influenza like illness in a long term care
facility in 72 hours (2)). However, for many HAIs there is no specific definition or
described threshold for investigating what might possibly be an outbreak.
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The total number of HAI outbreaks is unknown because not all outbreaks are
recognized and likely only a portion of those recognized are reported. Approximately 35
HAI outbreaks/year are reported to the New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH).
However, lacking is a general description of these outbreaks. Understanding the
characteristics of these outbreaks including pathogens, size, number of case fatalities, and
effect on health facility operations, will improve our response to them. Additionally,
describing what is reported, may help us be able to see outbreak types and characteristics
that are not as commonly recognized. Our specific aim with the first paper and part of the
project is to evaluate the characteristics of HAI outbreaks reported to NMDOH in the past
5 years, 2011–2015.
The second paper and project explores different methods for developing
thresholds for HAI outbreak detection. Specifically, we examined Clostridium difficile
infection (CDI) incidence in long-term care facilities (LTCF) with the aim of estimating
the potential number of possible CDI outbreaks and developing a method for detection of
possible CDI outbreaks in this setting.
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Chapter 2: Healthcare-Associated Infectious Disease Outbreaks Reported to New Mexico
Department of Health

Abstract
Background: Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) are a major cause of morbidity and
mortality. However, HAI outbreaks have not been systematically well studied. Here we
describe HAI outbreaks reported to New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH).
Methods: We conducted a retrospective descriptive analysis of HAI outbreaks, defined as
two or more epidemiologically linked HAIs at a healthcare facility, reported to NMDOH.
Characteristics included descriptions of the healthcare facilities, outbreaks, and
responses.
Results: During 2011–2015, 135 HAI outbreaks were reported to NMDOH, and 93%
occurred in long-term care facilities (LTCF). Excluding 2 outbreaks that lasted >1 year,
the median outbreak length was 11 days (range 1–72 days) with a median of 4 days
(range 0–61 days) from recognition to reporting. Gastrointestinal illness was most
common (101 [75%]). The most common pathogens identified were norovirus
(n=72;53%), influenza (n=20;15%), and Clostridium difficile (n=4;3%). There was a
median of 26 cases/outbreak (range 2–234) with more patients than staff affected. In 58
(44%) of outbreaks, the affected unit was closed, which in 88% of the cases were entire
facility closures.
Conclusions: Reported HAI outbreaks are most common in LTCFs, relatively short in
duration, and affect both patients and HCPs in noticeable numbers.
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Background
A national point-prevalence survey conducted in 2011 estimated that on any given
day 1 in 25 patients in acute care health facilities has a HAI (1). In a survey of infection
preventionists, 35% reported that their health facility had investigated an outbreak in the
past year (3). Cases occurring as part of outbreaks in are only a fraction of all HAI cases.
However, when HAI outbreaks occur they can spread rapidly, be a sign of underlying
systemic infection control issues, and put patients, healthcare personnel (HCP), and
visitors at risk of infection. Investigation of outbreaks can lead to insights about disease
transmission, demonstrate the effectiveness of certain interventions, and be the impetus
for implementing infection control measures that might have lasting impact on not only
the outbreak HAI, but other HAI that are transmitted similarly (4).
Examination of HAI outbreaks has been primarily pathogen focused (5-9) and of
infection control measures (10-16), with reviews about some special settings within
healthcare such as neonatal intensive care units (17). However, few studies have
reviewed all HAI outbreaks (surveillance data (18), survey (3), systematic reviews (4,
10)). Further description of HAI outbreaks is needed to focus response and prevention
efforts. Our primary aim in this study was to describe the characteristics of and response
to HAI outbreaks investigated by NMDOH.

Methods
We used a retrospective descriptive analysis of HAI outbreaks reported to
NMDOH during 2011 to 2015 (5 years). We defined a HAI outbreak as two or more
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epidemiologically linked healthcare-associated infections, as defined as a symptomatic
illness from a pathogen or its toxin which can be related to a medical procedure or to
exposure to the healthcare facility environment in HCPs, patients, or visitors of the
healthcare facility (18). Our unit of measure was HAI outbreaks. We describe the
characteristics of the healthcare facilities, the outbreak, and the response to the outbreak
including pathogen, mode of transmission, primary site (i.e. blood stream,
gastrointestinal, etc.), size of outbreak, type of facility, unit and facility closures, changes
in equipment, and treatments.
We extracted the information from electronically saved narrative outbreak reports.
We created a standardized form for data abstraction, which we piloted with the first nine
outbreaks abstracted. All data were directly abstracted into Microsoft Excel 2013
(Redmond, WA). We analyzed the data to assess descriptive characteristics of outbreaks.
All analyses were performed using SAS v9.3 software (SAS Institute, Carey, NC). The
protocol was internally reviewed and deemed public health practice.
Our hypotheses were that the majority, >50%, of the HAI outbreaks reported to
NMDOH would have one following characteristics:
(a) Caused by an unusual pathogen defined as any pathogen other than norovirus,
C. difficile, Staphylococcus aureus, or influenza
(b) Include HCP cases defined as at least one outbreak case in an HCP
(c) Occure in a short period of time defined as the entire outbreaks duration of
≤14 days
(d) Include case fatality defined as any case deaths attributed to the outbreak
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We thought these characteristics would be the ones most likely to cause identification and
prompt reporting of HAI outbreaks. We test these four hypotheses using a one sample,
one right sided proportion z-test. Each hypothesis translates to testing the null and
alternative H0: p≤0.50 versus H1: p>0.50.

Results
Outbreak characteristics: there were 135 HAI outbreaks reported to NMDOH in
2011 to 2015. The 135 outbreaks were reported from 69 health facilities with a median of
2 outbreaks per facility (range 1–6) in the 5 year period. Long-term care facilities
represented 93% of reports. Bernalillo County, the home of the largest New Mexican city
Albuquerque, where a third of the state’s population resides, was the source of 48% of
reports.
Gastrointestinal illness was the most common syndrome (101 [75%]) followed by
respiratory combined with influenza-like illness (28 [21%]). The remaining 6 outbreak
reports included bacteremia, skin and soft tissue infection, urinary tract infection, or
unknown. Where a specific pathogen was identified, norovirus was most common (72
[53%]) followed by influenza (20 [15%]), and then Clostridium difficile (4 [3%]) (Table
2.1). Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), pertussis, carbapenemresistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Burkholderia cepacia, and
Group A Streptococcus (GAS) represented 1 outbreak each during the 5 year period.
Duration of an outbreak was defined as the time from the first case to the last
case. Excluding the 2 outbreaks that lasted more than 1 year, the median outbreak length
was 11 days (range 1–62 days). The median was 4 days (range 0–61 days) from the
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recognized start of the outbreak to when it was reported. Among gastrointestinal
outbreaks, C. difficile lasted somewhat longer than norovirus on average (median 18 days
[range 10–71] vs 12 days [range 2–72]) (Table 2.2). Unidentified gastrointestinal
outbreaks were on average shorter (median 5 days [range 1 –25]) than norovirus, but had
a very similar range. Among the respiratory outbreaks, influenza was shorter than the
other respiratory illnesses (median 8 days [range 1–34]) vs 23 days [range 13–44]).
In the 127 outbreaks with case counts, there was a median of 26 cases per
outbreak (range 2–234). Of note, the outbreak reports commented on the fact that all
cases were not always captured, especially HCP cases. There were no visitors included in
case counts. However, visitors were thought to be the index case in 3 outbreaks (2%).
Patients were noted as the index case or were the first recognized cases in 33 (24%)
outbreaks and HCP in 19 (14%) outbreaks. However, it is not certain from the outbreak
reports how the true first case of disease entered into the facility. There were 103
outbreaks reporting patient cases (median 19 total case per outbreak [range 0–110]) and
95 outbreaks reporting HCP cases (median 8 total cases per outbreak [range 0–212]).
Zeros are included of the range from outbreaks where either patient or HCP cases were
not reported. Since we suspect that the total number of cases reported underrepresents the
total number of cases experienced, we report the average number of deaths not the case
fatality rate as typically presented. C. difficile outbreaks were associated with the highest
mean case fatality (2.7 deaths per outbreak [range 0–8]) followed by influenza (1.1
deaths per outbreak [range 0–3]). There were more case deaths than increases in level of
care during C. difficile outbreaks (2.7 deaths per outbreak [range 0–8] vs 1.7 cases whose
level of care was increased per outbreak [range 0–5]).
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Outbreak response: In 58 (44%) outbreaks the unit was closed, of which 88%
(51/58) entailed closure of the entire facility. Patient isolation was initiated by the facility
or recommended by NMDOH in 82 outbreaks (61%). Change in equipment was
recommended in 51 outbreaks (38%) which most commonly consisted of using
disposable service for meals during gastrointestinal outbreaks. There were some specific
recommendations when the outbreak was thought to be transmitted by equipment
including using single dose vials, disposable or sterilizable equipment, to clean
procedural equipment, and designated equipment for patients in isolation. In 14 of 20
influenza outbreaks (70%) vaccine was offered to eligible, unvaccinated, HCPs and in 10
of 20 influenza outbreaks (50%) vaccine was offered to eligible, unvaccinated, patients.
We were not able to determine the timing of interventions during the outbreak nor were
we able to tell from the reports which intervention were fully implemented.
Hypothesis testing: We expected that outbreaks with HCPs cases, caused by
unusual pathogens (pathogens other than norovirus, C. difficile, influenza, and S. aureus),
occurring in a short period of time (defined as ≤14 days), or with case fatalities would
lead to identification and prompt reporting in more than 50% of reported HAI outbreaks
(see methods section). The results indicate that outbreaks with HCP cases (84%, p<0.05
[95% Confidence Interval (C.I.) 0.77–0.92]) and outbreaks that occurred in ≤14 (62%,
p<0.05 [95% C.I. 0.53–0.71]) were reported >50% of the time (Table 2.3), consistent
with hypotheses (b) and (c). Outbreaks caused by unusual pathogens or with case
fatalities were not common characteristics of reported outbreaks (sample proportion was
less than 50%).
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Discussion
HAI outbreaks reported to NMDOH were relatively short in duration, occurred in
LTCF, affected both patients and HCPs, and caused gastrointestinal illness, which was
mostly commonly from norovirus. Our findings agree with previous reports (3, 18). We
had few outbreaks of unusual pathogens that were typically detected by astute clinical
microbiologists or clinicians who had seen ≥2 cases among their patients. None of these
methods is very systematic in identifying outbreaks, especially in lager healthcare
systems where different diagnostic laboratories might be used or patients are not
necessarily followed by the same provider. Strengthening systems approaches, including
automatizing recognition of pathogens across multiple laboratory and provider networks,
might lead to better HAI outbreak recognition. Detection of HAI outbreaks caused by
rare pathogens, pathogens that cause less acute disease, or those that are endemic in the
healthcare setting might particularly benefit from system wide approaches. Examples of
this includes hepatitis B (HBV) and hepatitis C (HCV) that are transmitted in the
healthcare setting and cause HAI outbreaks, but that without robust detection methods,
may go unnoticed (19, 20).
We expected that LTCF would be one of the more common facilities reporting
HAI outbreaks. However, we did not expect that almost all outbreak reports would be
from LTCFs. Several factors may explain why there is a higher than expected proportion
of LTCFs. The first is that other facility types may not see it necessary to report. One
example would be a large acute care facility that is able to manage the outbreak on their
own. In LTCFs the person assigned to infection prevention often has other clinical or
administrative duties and so may reach out to NMDOH more readily for assistance.
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Additionally, in LTCFs the person assigned to infection prevention may not have formal
training in infection prevention. A second theory is because of patients relatively long
length of stay in the same physical location HAI outbreaks in LTCF may be more likely
to be identified. A third possibility is that specific characteristics of LTCF promote
infections. Three possible unique characteristics of LTCF that might promote the spread
of infectious disease include: 1) communal patient activities, especially dining, that might
promote transmission, 2) high patient to HCP ratios, and 3) shared HCPs who work in
multiple facilities, who may transmit infection between facilities. There were notes about
shared HCPs possibly introducing infection from one facility to another in the NMDOH
reports we reviewed. This has been documented in previous gastrointestinal outbreaks as
well (21). Even when HCPs are not sick themselves fomites that are shared between
facilities could potentially transmit infection. As more facilities come under single
corporate management, this issue could increase. It highlights the importance of infection
control not only to protect those in the facility where the outbreak is occurring, but also in
associated facilities.
In general outbreaks were reported shortly after they were identified, with a
median of 4 days. However, the time of detection of the outbreak may not account for
initial cases. We observed this in three ways: (1) investigations did not always look back
in time past the first reported cases to identify earlier occurrences, (2) often the outbreak
started with many cases instead of growing exponentially as would be expected for many
of the infectious diseases reported, and (3) case definitions often did not include visitors
who may be the true index cases in facilities, especially for pathogens which are known
to cause community outbreaks. Visitors might be particularly important to the way that
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infections are introduced into LTCFs. With low patient turn over in LTCFs, patients are a
less likely way of circulating acute community disease. Additionally, in LTCF, family
members often provide care and assistance, but are without training or personal
protective equipment. While there is guidance for influenza vaccination for patients and
HCPs (2), this is not usually extended to family members or other visitors. Additionally,
while reminders about hand and respiratory hygiene are often recommended to be posted
during outbreaks, these interventions might be helpful in preventing outbreaks as well.
Other gastrointestinal outbreaks, where a pathogen could not be identified, might
have a short duration because only the end of the outbreak was identified. Alternatively,
they may have been caused by viruses that were not tested for but cause a syndrome like
norovirus. In a review of the gastrointestinal outbreaks, in LTCF reported in the
literature, 69% of outbreaks were caused by a virus, 83% of which was norovirus (57%
of the total), and bacterial infections were implicated in 31% of outbreaks (22). Other
respiratory outbreaks also had a similar profile to influenza with two exceptions, the level
of care increased more often than in influenza, but there were fever case deaths on
average. Among the other respiratory outbreaks 1 of the 8 was confirmed as pertussis.
The limitations of this study stem from the fact that our data source is outbreak
reports. Reports were commonly missing data elements and in some instances, there was
no report. Missing data prevented us from looking at associations between variables. For
example, we wanted to explore further if HCP cases might be associated with larger
patient case counts (10). However, HCP cases were frequently noted in the reports to be
missing. Furthermore, HCP screening, prophylaxis, treatment, and exclusions were
infrequently documented. Additionally, missing data made drawing conclusions difficult
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for some variables. For example, we believe that the proportion of outbreaks where
isolation was documented as a control measure more likely to reflect the completeness of
reporting on that measure as opposed to actual implementation. Likewise, rarely were
patients notified that they could have been potentially exposed. Notification may not be
well documented. However, isolation of both symptomatic and exposed individuals can
serve an important role in interrupting person to person transmission of disease.
In few instances, even when the outbreak was well documented, the causes and
magnitude were still not entirely clear. In this category were 3 outbreaks that had more
than one pathogen identified. These were two norovirus outbreaks that also had C.
difficile cases identified and one respiratory outbreak there were multiple possible
pathogenic causes, but no single unifying one.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Outbreaks Classified by Syndrome and Pathogen (n 135),
2011–2015
Outbreak Type1

Number

Median Duration (Range)
in Days
2
Norovirus
72 (53.3)
12 (2–72)
Clostridium difficile
4 (3.0)
18 (10–71)
Other Gastrointestinal
25 (18.5)
5 (1–25)
Influenza
20 (14.8)
8 (1–34)
Other Respiratory
8 (5.9)
23 (13–44)
Not included in the table are 6 single outbreaks whose syndromes included skin and soft
tissue, urinary tract infection, bacteremia, mixed urine and respiratory and pathogens
included MRSA, pertussis, CRE, P. aeruginosa, B. cepacia, and GAS
2
Includes two norovirus outbreaks with C. difficile cases
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(%)

Table 2.2: Case Information by Outbreak Syndrome or Pathogen (n 135), 2011–2015
Outbreak Type1
Total

Median Case Counts (Range)
Confirmed
Patients
Healthcare
Personnel

Norovirus2

34 (5–234)

Clostridium
difficile
Other
Gastrointestinal

10 (6–15)

7.5 (2–15)

7.5 (1–15)

22 (3–91)

— —

17 (3–78)

3 (1–10)

22 (0–110)

13 (0–
212)
2.73 (0–8)
7 (0–24)

Increased
Level of
Care3
2.6 (0–78)

Deaths3

0.1 (0–2)

1.7 (0–5)

2.7 (0–8)

0.6 (0–2)

0.1 (0–1)

Influenza
12 (3–49)
3 (1–9)
11 (0–49)
4 (0–19)
1.5 (0–6)
1.1 (0–3)
Other Respiratory 12.5 (7–50)
1 (0–12)
13 (11–50)
8 (1–31)
3 (1–9)
0.5 (0–3)
1
Not included in the table are 6 single outbreaks whose syndromes included skin and soft tissue, urinary tract infection,
bacteremia, mixed urine and respiratory and pathogens included MRSA, pertussis, CRE, P. aeruginosa, B. cepacia, and GAS
2
Includes two norovirus outbreaks with C. difficile cases
3
Mean used in replace of median when median equal to zero
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Table 2.3: Outbreak Identification Indicators and Results for Testing Hypotheses (a)–(d)
Outbreak Characteristics

̂, 95% CI)
n/N (𝒑

p value

Unusual pathogen1

6/135 (0.04, 0.01-0.08)

p>0.05 (Hypothesis a)

HCP cases

80/952 (0.84, 0.77-0.92)

p<0.05 (Hypothesis b)

Occur in short time period
(≤14 days)

69/1122 (0.62, 0.53-0.71)

p<0.05 (Hypothesis c)

Case deaths

11/902 (0.12, 0.05-0.19)

p>0.05 (Hypothesis d)

1

Unusual pathogens were defined as those other than norovirus, Clostridium difficile,
influenza, and Staphylococcus aureus
2
Outbreaks without this information recorded in New Mexico Department of Health
report were excluded

15

Chapter 3: Clostridium difficile Infection Outbreak Detection Methods in Long-Term
Care Facilities
Abstract
Background: Clostridium difficile infections (CDI) are a major cause of healthcareassociated infections resulting in morbidity and mortality for patients. Healthcareassociated CDI cases are reportable and outbreaks in this setting have been recognized.
However, methods for detecting CDI outbreaks have not been well studied or
standardized. Our aim is to estimate the potential number of CDI outbreaks in LTCFs and
develop a better working detection method.
Methods: We used retrospective laboratory confirmed incident CDI cases from long-term
care facilities (LTCF) in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. We applied 4 previously
described infectious disease detection algorithms (Epidemic Threshold [ET], Moving
Percentile Method [MPM], Cumulative Sum [CUSUM], and Exponential Weighted
Moving Average [EWMA]), to estimate periods of possible CDI outbreaks. To assess the
performance of the 4 algorithms, we compared them to reported outbreaks, 3 expert
infection preventionists’ opinions about what could be a possible outbreak, and clusters
observed in the data and defined by a new simple heuristic rule (≥3 cases averaged over
any 3 consecutive week period with at least 2 weeks between clusters).
Results: In 2012 –2015, for the 14 LTCFs included in this study, the weekly incidence
ranged from 0.16–11.24 per 10,000 resident days. All 4 methods detected the 1 reported
CDI outbreak. ET had the highest sensitivity and specificity in detecting expert visually
identified possible outbreaks (EVIPO) (sensitivity 98.0%, specificity 99.0%, accuracy
98.9%) and clusters (sensitivity 89.6%, specificity 99.3%, accuracy 98.3%).
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Conclusions: ET, the simplest method, had the highest sensitivity and specificity in
detecting possible CDI outbreaks. However, when case counts were low with many
weeks of zero incidence, the use of the new simple heuristic rule to identify clusters
might be sufficient in deciding whether to trigger an investigation for possible CDI
outbreaks.

Background
Healthcare-associated infectious disease (HAI) are a major cause of morbidity and
mortality, targeted as a public health priority. Clostridium difficile, an anaerobic Grampositive and spore-forming bacterium which causes toxin-mediated gastroenteritis, is an
intractable cause of HAI. CDI is due to a combination of environmental factors and host
susceptibility (23). An increasing trend of CDI burden in long-term care facilities (LTCF)
has been observed in the past two decades (24). The increased CDI risk in LTCF
residents is likely due to advanced age, extended length of stay, frequent hospitalizations,
and exposure to antibiotics (23, 25).
Among populations already at great risk for CDI, outbreaks can be difficult to
detect. There are multiple reasons why CDI outbreaks are difficult to detect including that
CDI is endemic, that the risk increases with typical healthcare-associated interventions,
and that it is environmentally stable making the epidemiologic link between cases harder
to define. Additionally, there are is no defined threshold or standard definitions for CDI
outbreaks. Reported outbreaks likely do not accurately represent the proportions of
different types of HAI outbreaks or the magnitude of the issue (18, 26). In part this is
because what is reported in the literature is more unusual than the routine HAI outbreaks.
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However, the other issue faced by infection preventionists and others working in public
health is that HAI outbreaks can go undetected. Therefore, having better detection
methods to prevent exponential spread, address infection control issues, and improve
patient outcomes is imperative. Investigation of outbreaks can lead to insights about
disease transmission, demonstrate the effectiveness of certain interventions, and be the
impetus for implementing infection control measures that might have lasting impact on
not only the outbreak, but other HAI that are transmitted similarly (4).
Healthcare-associated CDI cases, that are reportable to the New Mexico
Department of Health (NMDOH) (27) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), require reporting through the National Health Safety Network (NHSN) for acute
care facilities. Additionally, CMS is piloting reporting of CDI cases through NHSN in
LTCFs. However, we are not aware of any widely-accepted thresholds or algorithms used
to detect outbreaks. Additionally, definitions for estimated periods of transmission to aid
in detecting and investigating possible CDI outbreaks are not standard.
This study aims to estimate the number of possible CDI outbreaks and develop
better detection methods. Using routinely collected surveillance data from LTCF in
Bernalillo County, New Mexico, we applied previously described infectious disease
detection algorithms used in other settings and for other infectious diseases (28-31). For
comparison, we also asked local infection preventionists to review epidemic curves for
potential outbreaks and review CDI outbreaks among the LTCFs reported to the
NMDOH.
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Methods
Data sources: We used open access CMS data to obtain facility-level information
including annual bed counts, resident days, and average length of stay (32). Since 2011,
the New Mexico Emerging Infections Program (NM EIP) has been conducting
laboratory-based surveillance for LTCF-onset (LTCF-O) CDI cases in Bernalillo Country
(33). We obtained the CDI case counts from the NM EIP data. Reported CDI outbreaks
from the LTCFs in the NM EIP catchment area were reviewed at NMDOH.
For data completeness, we used data from 2012–2015. Facilities with greater than
1 year of missing resident days were excluded. For the 2 facilities that had a single
missing year of resident days, we used an average of the other 3 years for the imputation.
Facilities without all 4 years of CDI case count data were excluded. We included incident
CDI cases defined as stool specimen positive for C. difficile by identification of toxin by
Enzyme Immunoassay (EIA) or Nucleic Acid Amplification Tests (NAAT) obtained
from a patient without a C. difficile positive stool specimen in the previous 8 weeks at the
time of stool collection. Recurrent cases (defined as a positive stool specimen 2–8 weeks
after a prior positive) and repeat tests from incident or recurrent cases (defined as tests
positive within 2 weeks of the initial test for an incidence or recurrent case) were
excluded.
Data analysis: Weekly incidence was calculated using NM EIP facility case
counts and an estimated weekly facility resident days. We estimated the weekly resident
days from the annual resident days reported to CMS, assuming a >80% occupancy
capacity year-round. We then applied the following methods for outbreak detection to the
weekly CDI incidence:
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1. Epidemic Threshold (ET) (29): Using the weekly non-zero incidence, we calculated
the 95% upper confidence interval (UCI) for each facility. The 95% UCI was then
compared to the weekly incidence. When the weekly incidence exceeded the 95%
UCI, it was noted as a possible outbreak week.
2. Moving percentile method (MPM) (30): For stability in the calculations, we used
2012 to establish a baseline mean from which we took the 95th percentile. Advancing
forward, a new 95th percentile was calculated each week through the subsequent
years in each facility. When the weekly incidence exceeded the 95the percentile, it
was noted as a possible outbreak week.
3. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) (34): A one sided CUSUM was calculated by facility
using the mean incidence and the square root of the mean squared successive
difference as an estimate of the standard deviation (28, 34). We used standard values
for delta=1, and k=0.5, the reference, allowance, or slack value. Values of k=0.5 and
h=4 or 5, the upper bound/threshold value, generally work to detect shifts in the
mean of 1 standard deviation (30, 34). We choose h=2 given the generally low
incidence of CDI in our data. In national detection algorithms for gastrointestinal
pathogens such as Salmonella spp., h=0.5 and delta=0.5 have been used (28).
4. Exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) (34): For this method, we used
facility mean and variance, to calculate the Upper Confidence Interval, which for this
method is the detection threshold (EWMACHART statement SAS). The only
parameter we defined was the weight, λ. Suggested values are 0.05 ≤ λ ≥ 0.25 (34).
Smaller λ are able to detect smaller changes in incidence (34). However, since this is
a weight, a smaller λ weight may take longer to react to a change (34). Knowing that
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we had both of these scenarios, relatively small changes in incidence and long
periods of zero incidence, we choose a λ of 0.15.

Methods 1–4 (ET, MPM, CUSUM, and EWMA) were compared to CDI outbreaks
reported to NMDOH (one pure CDI outbreak and two norovirus outbreaks with CDI
cases) as the gold standard using sensitivity and specificity analysis. Since there was only
one pure CDI outbreak, we used two additional comparisons as the gold standard. Our
first method was expert visually identified outbreaks (EVIPO). To obtain the expert
opinion, the epidemic curves of weekly incidence in each facility was reviewed by 3 local
infection preventionists. They noted on the graphs which weeks they thought could be
possible outbreaks. When any 1 of the 3 denoted a week as a possible outbreak, we
defined it as positive by this method. Our second method was to define clusters in the
data. In reviewing the epidemic curves, we developed a simplified definition of a cluster
of CDI. The definition of a cluster is ≥3 cases averaged over any consecutive 3 week
period with at least 2 weeks of zero incidence between clusters. The remainder of the
weeks were divided by the average cluster length for a comparable “non-cluster” time to
calculate specificity. Our cluster definition was designed to capture longer time periods
of elevated incidence as well as weeks with very high incidence. Our cluster definition
was inspired roughly from the “rule of three” (35). In our data, a weekly CDI incidence
of zero was common. The “rule of three” states that the 95% confidence interval can be
estimated to be 3/n when the usual occurrence is 0/n. However, instead of choosing a 1
week period with three cases, we broadened the definition to ≥3 cases averaged over any
consecutive 3 week period to account increased incidence that didn’t rise to 3 cases in a
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single week, but was elevated and often this elevation lasted for a longer period of time.
We considered any of the four methods to have detected a cluster if at least one week was
flagged during its time period. We used the number of weeks flagged outside of clusters
divided by the total number of non-cluster periods to estimate the proportion (p) of noncluster periods misclassified. The latter calculation could be used to quantify the
specificity of detection according to 1-p.
Data was maintained Microsoft Excel 2013 (Redmond, WA). Analyzes were
performed in both using SAS v9.3 (SAS Institute, Carey, NC) and Microsoft Excel 2013
(Redmond, WA) software. The protocol for this study was reviewed by the University of
New Mexico Health Sciences Human Research Review Committee (HRRC 00016856).

Results
The 14 facilities included in this study had a median 120 beds, a median length of
stay of 94 days, and a median annual occupancy capacity of 89.7% with only one facility
<80%. Mean weekly incidence ranged from 0.16–11.24 per 10,000 resident days (Table
3.1). During 2012–2015, there was a range of <10–64 cases in the 4 year period with 2
facilities having case counts <10. In the other 12 facilities, incidence and clusters were
spread over the course of years. By our definition of a cluster as ≥3 cases in any
consecutive 3 week period with at least 2 weeks between clusters, there were 77 clusters
over the 4 years with a median length of 3 weeks (range 1–21). These same two facilities
with case counts <10 also did not have any clusters of CDI cases. Our experts visually
detected 49 possible outbreaks (EVIPO) in the 4 years with a median length of 6 weeks
(range 1–29).
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The accuracy for detecting both EVIPO and clusters was >85% for all methods
(Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). ET had the highest sensitivity and specificity in detecting
EVIPO (sensitivity 98.0%, specificity 99.0%, accuracy 98.9%) and clusters (sensitivity
89.6%, specificity 99.3%, accuracy 98.3%). Our experts were not quite as sensitive in
detecting clusters, but specificity remained high (sensitivity 91.8%, specificity 89.6%,
accuracy 72.7%). The lowest sensitivity was using in the EWMA.
ET and MPM detected periods of higher incidence, which is equated to ≥2 cases
per week. CUSUM and EWMA also captured most of these high incidence periods, but
also detected some periods of ongoing low incidence (Figure 1). MPM, EWMA, and
especially CUSUM stayed elevated for a prolonged period of time after a period of higher
incidence. Both ET and CUSUM detected clusters with sensitivity and specificity >80%
(Table 3.3).
We reviewed 3 outbreaks that were reported to NMDOH with CDI cases in the 14
facilities, 2012–2015. Two of these were norovirus outbreaks with 2 recognized CDI
positive cases each at the time. In both facilities, there were >2 CDI cases in the weeks
around the time of the outbreak report in the surveillance data. The 3rd CDI outbreak
report represents a purely CDI outbreak. It described 9 CDI cases, including several
individuals with a history of CDI as well as recent admissions to the facility, in a 23 day
period. All detection methods identified this outbreak. ET detected as possible outbreaks
the CDI cases included in the norovirus outbreaks. MPM detected as possible CDC
outbreak one of the norovirus outbreaks with CDI cases. In the other norovirus outbreak
with CDI cases, MPM detected the 2 weeks prior as possible outbreak. CDI incidence
was higher during these 2 weeks than during the norovirus outbreak. CUSUM and
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EWMA only detected 1 of the 2 norovirus outbreaks with CDI cases. With only 1 pure
and verified CDI outbreak further comparisons were not made.

Discussion
ET defined as the upper 95% confidence interval calculated without zero
incidence was most sensitive in detecting reported outbreaks, defined clusters, and
possible outbreaks visualized by expert infection preventionists reviewing the epidemic
curves. This is a relatively simple statistic that can be calculated at the facility level. In
the facilities included in this study the upper 95% confidence interval of the incidence
equated to 1–2 cases per week for all facilities except 1 of the 14 facilities that had an ET
of 2–3 cases per week. A more simplified heuristic rule such as a threshold of 2 cases per
week or our cluster definition of ≥3 cases in a 3 week period would not require any
calculations to be implemented, but would also not be generalizable to facilities with
higher case counts, which is why we approached this using weekly incidence.
Reviewing the epidemic curves visually demonstrated to us that ET was more
sensitive than the other methods in this relatively low incidence data because the
threshold did not change. Prior studies demonstrated that more stable methods with fewer
parameters (e.g. ET and MPM) perform better than more complex ones (e.g. CUSUM
and EWMA) (29, 30). However, specific outbreak parameters such as size and baseline
incidence affected methods’ performance. The other methods, MPM, CUSUM, and
EWMA, varied in their threshold level which made them less sensitive. Additionally,
because their threshold stayed elevated for a prolonged period after a cluster when the
incidence had returned to zero, the specificity of these methods was also low.
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There were few reported outbreaks to compare to our detection methods. We
believe this is the essence of why it is important to develop further guidance for outbreak
detection. To compare methods, we asked experts to review the weekly epidemic curves,
which might be one approach that facilities could take. We defined what appeared to be
clusters. However, with the retrospective data available to us these clusters could not be
verified as true outbreaks. We observed that long duration, relatively low incidence
periods were not captured by the cluster definition. Even in reported clusters that are
thought to be outbreaks, confirming linkage between cases is difficult since
microbiologic information beyond the diagnosis is not often available and C. difficile can
persist in the environment for many weeks (36, 37).
Reviewing CDI outbreaks from facilities throughout NM reported to NMDOH in
2011–2015, we observed a median outbreak duration of 18 days with 10 cases per
outbreak and 2.7 deaths per outbreak. Using 49 EVIPOs and 77 clusters in our 14
facilities over 4 years, we calculate 0.9–1.4 outbreaks per facility per year. Extrapolated
to the 15,600 LTCFs in the United State, this is 14,040–21,840 possible CDI outbreaks
(38). Even if only a quarter are true outbreaks and only a quarter of the cases and deaths
are prevented by recognizing these outbreaks, this could still potentially be 8,775–13,650
cases and 2,306–3,587 deaths averted.
Without investigating of the EVIPO or clusters, we cannot say if they truly
represent outbreaks. However, the aim of this project is to develop a trigger for
investigating what might be an outbreak. Including some periods that could be outbreaks,
but turn out not to be upon investigation, is expected for a detection system. Ideally a
detection system should have very high sensitivity. Overall, we had very high sensitivity
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with all methods except EWMA. We also had high specificity, which is likely elevated
by large periods of zero incidence. Even the methods with responsive threshold, MPM,
CUSUM, and EWMA, detected only a relatively small portion of the non-cluster time.
Therefore, the number of non-cluster periods not detected (true negatives) is very high
and leads to high specificity.
The other methods, in particular CUSUM, could potentially have better sensitivity
by optimizing the parameters. We did this to some extent, but only within values used in
previous studies. With more verified outbreaks (e.g. in a setting where outbreaks were
defined and reported or in a study done prospectively investigating cases detected by
various methods) parameters could realistically be further optimized. Additionally, the
stability of MPM would improve with additionally data points added to the development
of the baseline.
There were several limitations to this study. First, we had to develop several
assumptions in our calculations for comparison—a) we assumed that facilities with >80%
occupancy capacity that annual resident days could be divided evenly over the course of
the year to produce a weekly incidence and b) that undetected periods were equivalent to
detected periods in defining non-cluster time periods. Secondly, as discussed, we did not
have enough detected, investigated, and verified outbreaks to compare our methods to.
Third, even when CDI outbreaks are investigated, it can be difficult link cases together
because C. difficile can last for a long time in the environment, can colonize individuals
who remain asymptomatic, but can transmit CDI, and rarely is microbiologic information
available (36, 37, 39).
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Table 3.1: Facility Description, Cases Counts, and Weekly Incidence, 2012–2015
Facility

Case Count

Mean

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N

1.00
1.35
1.20
1.30
1.22
1.25
1.24
1.33
1.33
1.00
1.44
1.45
1.19
1.26

Weekly Incidence per 10,000 Resident
Days

Standard
95%
Deviation Confidence
Interval
LowerUpper
0.00
..
0.58
1.19 1.50
0.54
1.07 1.34
0.58
1.15 1.44
0.42
1.08 1.36
0.57
1.11 1.40
0.55
1.09 1.39
0.56
1.09 1.57
0.61
1.14 1.52
0.00
..
0.58
1.24 1.64
0.54
1.17 1.73
0.60
0.97 1.41
0.54
1.09 1.42
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Mean

1.34
7.75
11.24
4.64
3.21
4.75
4.14
2.44
3.67
0.16
5.02
2.50
1.45
1.07

Standard
Deviation

6.39
14.66
19.41
7.99
7.58
8.28
8.00
7.48
8.30
1.36
9.51
7.14
4.00
2.37

95%
Confidence
Interval
Lower Upper
0.48 2.21
5.76 9.73
8.61 13.87
3.56 5.72
2.19 4.24
3.63 5.87
3.06 5.22
1.42 3.45
2.55 4.80
-0.02 0.35
3.73 6.30
1.53 3.47
0.91 1.99
0.75 1.39

Table 3.2: Detection of Clostridium Difficile outbreaks with Expert Visual Identified
Possible Outbreaks (EVIPO) as the gold standard
Detection Method

EVIPO
Sensitivity Specificity
Detected
/Total
EVIPO1
48/49
98.00
99.01

Accuracy

Epidemic Threshold (Upper
98.85
95% Confidence Interval)
Moving 95th Percentile
30/352
85.71
98.51
96.93
(MPM)
Cumulative Sum
38/49
77.55
88.18
86.58
Exponentially Weighted
20/49
40.81
98.89
90.15
Moving Average
1
Where any 1 of 3 experts identified a period as possible outbreak
2
For the MPM method, the number of identified outbreaks by the gold standard method
(EVIPO) was 35 because the year 2012 was excluded to establish a baseline mean for the
95th percentile

Table 3.3: Detection of Clostridium Difficile outbreaks with Cluster as the gold standard
Detection Method

Detected
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
Clusters /Total
Clusters
69/77
89.61
99.34
98.34

Epidemic Threshold (Upper
95% Confidence Interval)
Moving 95th Percentile
35/471
74.47
98.46
96.31
(MPM)
Cumulative Sum
62/77
80.52
87.19
86.40
Exponentially Weighted
25/77
32.47
98.85
91.37
Moving Average
Expert Visual Identification
56/77
72.73
91.79
89.62
of Possible Outbreaks
(EVIPO)2
1
For the MPM method, the number of identified outbreaks by the gold standard method
(EVIPO) was 35 because the year 2012 was excluded to establish a baseline mean for the
95th percentile
2
Where any 1 of 3 experts identified a period as possible outbreak
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Figure 1: Detection Method Thresholds by Weekly Clostridium Difficile Infection Incidence per 10,000 Resident Days and
Cases per Week in One Example Long-Term Care Facility, 2012–2014
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Chapter 4: Conclusions
Reported HAI outbreaks are most commonly in LTCF, relatively short in
duration, and affect both patients and HCPs. This HAI outbreak profile is very commonly
reported to public health authorities. Streamlining response procedures, especially for
common pathogens, could assist facilities and public health officials in day to day
operations, coordinate response, and improve the study and subsequent understanding of
which infection control measures are most effective. Additionally, we think there is a
need to develop detection methods for HAI outbreaks that may be less easily recognized.
Reliance on astute HCPs to identify outbreaks is likely to cause gaps in our ability to
detect outbreaks, especially in more complex health systems.
To understand detection more systematically, we examined CDI incidence in
LTCFs for possible outbreaks using established methods for outbreak detection. We
determined that the simplest method, ET—the upper 95% confidence interval, appears to
have the best sensitivity and specificity in detecting possible CDI outbreaks. This is the
first step to increasing detection of possible HAI outbreaks. However, using the new
heuristic rule to identify clusters might be sufficient in deciding whether to trigger
investigations for possible CDI outbreaks in a setting with relatively low incidence.
Detection of CDI outbreaks potentially would mean thousands of averted cases and
would allow for advancements in our understanding of environment and individual risk
factors. Ultimately, we hope that this would lead to better outbreak detection and control.
This work comes at a time when NMDOH is updating and standardizing
investigation procedures for commonly investigated diseases in the healthcare setting.
Additionally, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and the
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Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), along with other partners have
recently created a HAI outbreak detection and response council to develop improved
guidance for HAI outbreak identification and response (40). We hope that this project can
assist in informing this effort.
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